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Introduction
The US market for sports gaming activities
is established and growing. In 2009 alone, the
legal horserace parimutuel pools took in
gross US bets 2 of US $12.3 billion (Angst,
2010). 3 The state of Nevada has race betting
as well, but also is the only state with
virtually unrestricted legalized sports betting
similar to that commonly found outside the
United States. In 2009 and 2010, Nevada
gross legal sports bets amounted to $2.6
billion and $2.8 billion, respectively, and
gross legal race bets amounted to $400
million and $381 million, respectively (State

of Nevada, 2009, 2010). Yet, as large as these
industry numbers are, they do not include the
overwhelming amount of illegal betting
conducted in the United States each year.
While it is difficult to accurately quantify the
size of the illegal betting market since, at the
very least, its illegality tends toward
nondisclosure, a recent investigative news
report estimated the three sports that garner
the majority of illegal US bets are football (US
version), basketball, and baseball, with
approximately $255–$300 billion bet
annually (“Top Sports for Illegal Wagers,”
2009). Although the accuracy of this estimate
is indeterminable, it is fair to say that the
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illegal gambling market is indeed quite
significant. These figures also do not include
gaming revenues from sports-related games
not traditionally considered gambling, such
as fantasy sports, which alone in 2009
accounted for additional annual revenues of
$1.5 billion in the United States (Ankeny,
2009; Dahle, 2008; Spaeder, 2009).
It is understandable that given the
enormity of these figures and the success of
interactive gaming companies with their
recent billion-dollar valuations, companies
want to participate in the US sports gaming
market (Levy & Satariano, 2009). However, it
may not be readily apparent which activities
are permissible under US law or how those
activities must be structured to comply with
US law.
At times, the legality of sports gaming in
the United States can appear to be in a
constant state of flux. Courts and companies
continually grapple with interpreting
antiquated anti-gaming laws for a modern
gaming industry. Special interests, such as
political conservatives, regularly seek to
enact additional anti-gaming laws and
diminish gaming opportunities while others,
such as gaming operators, simultaneously
seek to test the limits of, modify, and expand
the same. Moreover, the myriad of US laws,
court decisions, US Department of Justice
(DOJ) legal stances (and eventual
prosecutions), and sports gaming operations
create divergent views and arguments as to
which forms of sports gaming are legal in the
United States.
This state of confusion and concern
regarding the legality of sports gaming
activities has led some US- and EU-based
businesses to operate in the United States
only later to find they are defending
prosecution or negotiating settlements with
the Department of Justice (“BetOnSports
Fined $28 Million,” 2009; Richtel, 2004; Ryan,
2007; United States v. $6,976,934.56, 2006;
United States v. Betonsports PLC, 2006; United
States v. John David Lefebvre, 2007; United
States v. Stephen Eric Lawrence, 2007). Such
confusion has been amplified by the recent
World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute

challenging the US position on horserace
betting, but as we illustrate later, each side of
this dispute was, in fact or in effect, arguing in
error. Consequently, the ultimate rulings in
the WTO dispute arose from an incorrect
understanding of the US anti-gaming laws.
The purpose of this review, therefore, is to
explain the framework of US sports gaming
laws and set forth forms of sports gaming
activities that are permitted in the United
States.

US Legal System
Before embarking on an analysis of US
sports gaming laws, a brief review of the US
legal system is beneficial. The United States
has a two-tier structured government divided
between the federal and state governments
(Chemerinsky, 2002). Federal law is enacted
by the US Congress—the legislative arm of
the federal government—and is supreme to
law enacted by each state. The federal
government, however, can only pass laws if it
has clear authority to do so. Otherwise,
governance is left to the states (Chemerinsky,
2002).
Correspondingly, there are two court
systems split between the federal and state
jurisdictions. The federal and state court
systems are divided regionally and operate
on a vertical hierarchy within each region. At
the federal level, the highest court is the US
Supreme Court, followed by the 13 regional
US Circuit Courts of Appeal, and then the
regional US District Courts that fall within one
of the 13 federal appellate circuits. A similar
system exists at the state level, wherein most
commonly each state has a supreme court,
followed by a court of appeals, and then
district courts (Burnham, 2002).
Not all court decisions are binding on all
courts. The US Supreme Court decisions are
binding on all federal and state courts.
However, within each regional federal and
state court system, the decisions of higher
courts are binding on the lower courts, but
the decisions of courts outside each
respective region are only persuasive, not
binding (Chemerinsky, 2002). The federal
courts only hear certain cases, most
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commonly involving questions of federal law
but also may include state law. In interpreting
federal law, the federal courts follow
precedent within their respective region up
to the US Supreme Court and may look to
other federal regions for interpretations of
the law that are persuasive but do not require
mandatory compliance (Chemerinsky, 2002).
The state courts hear almost any type of case
other than cases that are heard exclusively by
the federal courts. Similarly, in interpreting
state law, the state courts follow precedent
within their respective region up to the US
Supreme Court and may look to other state
regions for persuasive interpretations
(Burnham, 2002). Additionally, the state
courts may interpret federal law if applicable
to the case before the state court, which is
subject to review by the federal courts.

Federal Gaming Regulation
With some exceptions, the federal
government has not traditionally played a
major role in regulating the gaming industry
(Gottfried, 2004). Instead, gaming regulation
and enforcement has been viewed as most
appropriate for states—that is, to allow each
state to decide which gaming activities are
legal. 4 One of the first instances of federal
regulation can be traced back to 1890, when
Congress passed a law prohibiting the sale of
lottery tickets through the mail. Congress
passed the law in response to the Louisiana
lottery, a notorious lottery that was run by a
New York syndicate to promote bribery.
Following the introduction of the federal law,
the state legislature shut down the lottery
two years later (Thompson, 1994). Then, in
1951 Congress passed the Gambling Devices
Act of 1951. This Act, as amended by the
Gambling Devices Act of 1962, supplements
state law by prohibiting the interstate
transportation of gambling devices into
jurisdictions where their manufacture or
possession is not specifically legal, and
imposing registration and recordkeeping
requirements on those who manufacture and
distribute the devices for public use (Cabot,
1998). Similar to the 1890 legislation, the
Gambling Devices Act of 1951 was introduced

to combat organized crime associated with
the proliferation of gambling in the United
States. Specifically, the Gambling Devices Act
of 1951 was the result of a report published
by the US Senate Special Committee on
Investigative Organized Crime in Interstate
Commerce that concluded “organized
criminal gangs operating in interstate
commerce are firmly entrenched in our large
cities in the operation of many different
gambling enterprises . . . as well as other
rackets. . . .” (Kefauver, 1951, p. 1). Moreover,
beginning in the 1960s, the federal
government determined the states needed
assistance in enforcing their laws against
unlawful gaming activities, particularly
organized crime, and proceeded to pass a
series of federal anti-gaming laws.
Most of these more recent federal laws
merely prohibit the offering of gaming
activities in states where such activities are
already illegal under state law (Gottfried,
2004). Consequently, federal gaming laws, in
general, do not replace state laws; rather,
they protect them from circumvention in
interstate and foreign 5 commerce (Shaker,
2007). The DOJ is the chief law enforcement
agency of the United States and plays a
prominent role in preventing circumvention
in interstate and foreign commerce by
enforcing US federal gaming laws and
prosecuting persons violating those laws.

The Wagering Paraphernalia Act
The Federal Wire Wager Act of 1961 (Wire
Act) is the preeminent federal law controlling
the sports betting industry; however, several
other acts are worth noting. For instance,
while certainly less prominent than the Wire
Act, the Interstate Transportation of
Wagering Paraphernalia Act of 1961 (WPA;
2009) was enacted as part of the same federal
legislation as the Wire Act and on the very
same day. The WPA criminalizes the
interstate and foreign transportation “of any
record, paraphernalia, ticket, certificate, bills,
slip, token, paper, writing, or other device
used, or to be used, adapted, devised or
designed for use in” bookmaking, wagering
pools with respect to a sporting event, or a
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numbers policy, bolita, or similar game (US
Code & Cong. News, 1961).
The WPA is intended to accomplish a very
specific function: “It erects a substantial
barrier to the distribution of certain materials
used in the conduct of various forms of illegal
gambling” by cutting off supplies used in
illegal gaming (Erlenbaugh v. United States,
1972, p. 246). When drafting the WPA,
Congress employed broad language to
“permit law enforcement to keep pace with
the latest developments” (United States v.
Mendelsohn, 1990, p. 1187). As a
consequence, many of the WPA’s terms are
general, undefined, and unspecific, such as
“paraphernalia,” “paper,” “writing,” and
“device.” This enables the DOJ and US courts
to interpret and apply the WPA’s prohibitions
as needed for the circumstances at hand.
For example, in United States v.
Mendelsohn, the court held that a computer
disk containing a software program for
recording and analyzing bets on sporting
events is wagering paraphernalia (United
States v. Mendelsohn, 1990). Similarly, in
People v. World Gaming, a New York State
court declared that an Internet gaming
website located in Antigua violated the WPA
by sending records of illegal gaming activity
into the state of New York (People v. World
Gaming, 1999, p. 852). Moreover, the court
further held that the Internet gaming
operator violated the WPA by sending
computers from the United States to Antigua
that would ultimately be used for conducting
illegal gaming operations between the United
States and Antigua (People v. World Gaming,
1999, p. 853). Thus, practically any tangible
devices, including software and electronics,
intended to be used in illegal gaming
activities, regardless of whether they have
uses outside those activities, are
encompassed in the WPA’s prohibitions.
Due to the breadth of the WPA’s
prohibitions, exceptions are included in the
WPA to clarify which activities are legal.
Without the inclusion of these exceptions, the
transportation of any wagering paraphernalia
across state lines would be illegal regardless
of the legality of gaming or possession of such

paraphernalia in either the state that is
sending paraphernalia to or receiving
paraphernalia from another state or foreign
jurisdiction. Some of the WPA exceptions
include (1) wagering materials carried by a
common carrier (e.g., the US Postal Service)
in the usual course of business; (2) parimutuel betting equipment or tickets where
legally acquired; (3) pari-mutuel materials
used at racetracks or other sporting events
where state law allows such betting; (4)
betting materials to be used to place bets or
wagers on a sporting event into a state whose
laws allow such betting; (5) any newspaper
or similar publication; (6) equipment, tickets,
or materials to be used in a state-run lottery;
and (7) equipment, tickets, or materials
designed to be used and transported to a
foreign country for a legal lottery (Cabot,
1998).

The Federal Wire Wager Act
Whereas the WPA focuses upon tangible
items, the Wire Act, in contrast, applies to
intangible items. Specifically, the Wire Act
prohibits using almost any known interstate
or foreign communications medium for
transmitting bets, transmitting information
assisting in placing bets, or transmitting
information entitling a person to credit or
money as a result of a bet on any sporting
event or contest (Federal Wire Wager Act of
1961, 2009). Subsection 1084(a) sets forth
the Wire Act’s prohibitions.
Whoever being engaged in the
business of betting or wagering
knowingly uses a wire communication
facility6 for the transmission in
interstate or foreign commerce of bets
or wagers or information assisting in the
placing of bets or wagers on any
sporting event or contest, or for the
transmission of a wire communication
which entitles the recipient to receive
money or credit as a result of bets or
wagers, or for information assisting in
the placing of bets or wagers, shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than two years, or both.
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Subsection 1084(b) of the Wire Act also
contains a much-cited exception known as
the “safe harbor” provision.
Nothing in this section shall be
construed to prevent the transmission in
interstate or foreign commerce of
information . . . assisting in the placing of
bets or wagers on a sporting event or
contest from a State or foreign country
where wagering on that sporting event
or contest is legal into a State or foreign
country in which such wagering is legal.
The safe harbor only applies to the
transmission of “information assisting in the
placing of bets,” not to the transmission of (1)
bets or (2) wire communications entitling the
recipient to money or credit as a result of
bets. The exception is further narrowed by its
requirement that the betting at issue be legal
in both jurisdictions in which the
transmission occurs (Federal Wire Wager Act
of 1961, 2009).
At first blush, this seems to be clear
enough. However, the Wire Act is extremely
poorly written, to the point of being
incomprehensible in parts. For example,
Subsection 1084(a) is a single sentence
containing 94 words (Cabot, 2010). In
practice, this has led to considerable debate
and confusion regarding the breadth of the
Wire Act.
Even the first ten words of the Wire Act,
which appear to be the clearest, require
interpretation by the courts since Congress
failed to define what exactly qualifies as being
“in the business of betting or wagering”
(Federal Wire Wager Act of 1961, 2009).
Essentially, the courts have found this
requires that a person not only be engaged in
the “sale of a product or service for fee”
(United States v. Barborian, 1981, p. 329), but
that the person also be engaged in a
“continuing course of conduct” (United States
v. Scavo, 1979, p. 843). Accordingly, where a
gaming operator charges customers for its
service, such as charging fees for accepting or
brokering bets, this would be the continuing
activities that equate to a business operation
and will likely constitute being “engaged in
the business of betting or wagering,” thus

leaving them open to liability under the
statute (Federal Wire Wager Act of 1961,
2009; United States v. Scavo, 1979, pp. 841–
843). The Wire Act does not, however, go
after the casual gambler. 7
The United States v. Cohen case found an
Internet sports betting operation was in the
business of betting or wagering and
established the applicability of the Wire Act
to Internet sports betting in foreign
commerce (United States v. Cohen, 2001).
Cohen operated an offshore sports betting
company—the World Sports Exchange
(WSE)—based in Antigua that accepted bets
on a wide range of sports (“Man Jailed in 1st
Online Gambling Conviction,” 2000). Patrons
would establish and fund accounts with the
company in Antigua typically through wire
transfers, and the company would only place
bets from those Antiguan accounts. However,
the company would take telephone calls and
Internet communications from US patrons
where the patrons would relay information
on which bets the company should place
using funds from their Antigua accounts.
Cohen maintained that the Wire Act should
not apply because his business was licensed
in Antigua and all bets were taken, recorded,
and processed in Antigua. The court, on
appeal from his conviction, held that the bets
take place both in the state where the bettor
resides and where the servers or service
provider resides; therefore, the bets took
place at least in part in the state of New York.
Since the bets took place in the United States,
the court held the Wire Act applied, and
Cohen’s conviction for violating the Wire Act
was upheld.
Of greater debate is whether the Wire Act
applies to betting on nonsports gaming. The
debate centers on whether the Wire Act is
read to apply to any “sporting event” and
“sporting contest,” or “sporting event” and
“contest,” which in the later case is seen as a
prohibition of not only sports betting but also
all other types of betting contests (Rodefer,
2004). The DOJ’s official position is that
“contest” is distinct from “sporting event” and
that Internet casino games, among others, are
“contests”; thus, the DOJ concludes that using
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interstate and/or foreign communications
media for betting on Internet casino games is
prohibited under the Wire Act (Hearing on
Establishing Consistent Enforcement Policies
in the Context of Online Wagers, 2007).
Contrary to the DOJ’s position, the Wire
Act’s legislative history and wording permits
a strong argument that it pertains only to
sports betting, as the Wire Act explicitly
enumerates “sporting event or contest,” with
the word “sporting” predicating both the
word “event” and “contest” (Federal Wire
Wager Act of 1961, 2009). This is supported
by the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit (a federal court) ruling that the Wire
Act applies only to sports betting, not other
types of gaming (In re MasterCard Int’l Inc.,
2002). This court’s opinion upheld the ruling
of a lower federal court in Louisiana, which
found “sporting” modifies both “event” and
“contest,” and, therefore, the federal Court of
Appeals concluded the Wire Act alone does
not prohibit betting on Internet casino games.
Nevertheless, courts in other federal
circuits have drawn different conclusions,
finding the second and third prohibited uses
of a wire communication facility under
Subsection 1084(a) (i.e., transmitting
information assisting in placing bets and
transmitting entitlement to receive money or
credit resulting from a bet) do not require
that the bets to which those prohibited uses
relate be limited to bets placed on sports
alone.
In United States v. Lombardo, the federal
court concluded the phrase “sporting event or
contest” modifies only the first of the three
prohibited uses of a wire communication
facility (i.e., transmitting bets) (United States
v. Lombardo, Memorandum Decision and
Order Denying Defendants’ Motions to
Dismiss, 2007). The court continued, finding
that Congress must have intentionally
excluded “sporting event or contest” as a
qualifier from the second and third
prohibited uses and thus indicates that at
least part of Subsection 1084(a) applies to
forms of gaming that are unrelated to
sporting events. In reaching this decision,
however, this federal court inexplicably cited

a state court decision indirectly supporting its
conclusion that the Wire Act applies to
gaming other than sports betting. Based on
the manner in which the US legal system
functions, as described earlier, this is
problematic for several reasons. First, a
federal court is relying on a state court’s
interpretation of a federal law when the
federal court should interpret the federal
law—not look to a state court’s interpretation
of federal law for the basis of its
interpretation. Second, if a federal court is
going to look to another court, then it should
have looked to prior federal court decisions
on the same subject matter, like the ruling of
the Fifth Circuit court just mentioned. Third,
even if a basis existed to rely on the state
court, the federal court’s reliance was in error
since the state court did not even actually
address the issues underlying the federal
court’s conclusion.
Recently, another court used comparable
logic, finding the Wire Act applicable to
nonsports betting and thus denied a motion
filed by Gary Kaplan 8 to dismiss the Wire Act
counts charged against him (United States v.
Kaplan, 2008). Although the Lombardo court
and the Kaplan court each find the Wire Act
applicable to all types of gaming, even they
did not uniformly comprehend the Wire Act’s
language since they reached their conclusions
by interpreting Subsection 1084(a)
differently (Hichar, 2009).
An analysis of the Wire Act’s legislative
history and the exceptions in Subsection
1084(b) along with the prohibitions in
Subsection 1084(a) substantiate that the
positions of the Lombardo and Kaplan courts
are nonsensical. To contend Congress was
more concerned with nonsports betting, such
as betting on lotteries and casino games, than
with betting on sports events is not justifiable
(Hichar, 2009). For instance, even the title of
the House Judiciary Report on the legislative
bill that became the Wire Act was entitled
“Sporting Events—Transmissions of Bets,
Wagers, and Related Information” (H.R. Rep.
87-967, 1961). Additionally in 1961 when the
Wire Act was enacted, the notion that a
person would use the telephone or telegraph
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to bet on anything but race and sporting
events was unrealistic (In re MasterCard Int’l
Inc., 2002). Consequently, the prohibitions in
Subsection 1084(a), like the safe harbor in
Subsection 1084(b), were likely intended to
apply only when the underlying betting
related to sporting events or (sporting)
contests.

The Interstate Horseracing Act
Even if courts, unlike the Lombardo and
Kaplan courts, strictly follow the legislative
history and wording of the Wire Act and do
not make efforts to expand the applicability of
the Wire Act’s language, questions still arise
as to the ambit of the Wire Act. Most notably,
does the Wire Act’s general prohibition apply
to interstate or foreign betting on the sport of
horseracing? While one may question the
veracity of such a concern given the relative
straightforwardness of sports betting as the
basis for the Wire Act, ambiguity has arisen
from the differing viewpoints between the
horseracing industry and the DOJ.
As discussed, the Wire Act prohibits “the
transmission in interstate or foreign
commerce of bets or wagers or information
assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on
any sporting event or contest, or for the
transmission of a wire communication which
entitles the recipient to receive money or
credit as a result of bets or wagers, or for
information assisting in the placing of bets or
wagers. . . .” (Federal Wire Wager Act of 1961,
2009), whereas the safe harbor provision
excepts from the general prohibition “the
transmission in interstate or foreign
commerce . . . of information assisting in the
placing of bets or wagers on a sporting event
or contest from a State or foreign country
where betting on that sporting event or
contest is legal into a State or foreign country
in which betting is legal” (Federal Wire
Wager Act of 1961, 2009). The substantial
difference between the body of the Wire Act
and the safe harbor is that the Wire Act
makes it unlawful to transmit bets,
information assisting in the placing of bets,
and information entitling persons to money
or credit resulting from bets, while the safe

harbor only excepts the interstate or foreign
transmission of information assisting in the
placing of bets.
This seemingly small difference opened the
door for the horseracing industry to allow
innovative betting methods on an interstate
and foreign platform, particularly off-track
betting. Besides accepting bets directly at the
racetrack, US racetracks also accept off-track
betting on horseraces, which, in general, is
any system enabling patrons to place bets on
races while not being physically present at
the racetrack and usually is done through an
intermediary. The two most prevalent forms
of off-track betting are account wagering
(also known as advance deposit wagering)
and off-track betting facilities (also known as
OTB facilities). Account wagering allows a
patron to make advanced deposits with an
intermediary or the racetrack and then place
a bet via the telephone, computer, or other
method of communication. An OTB facility, on
the other hand, is a physical location where
patrons assemble to place bets on the races
being conducted at another location.
The Interstate Horseracing Act (IHA) was
enacted in 1978 and provides rules to govern
the horseracing industry and off-track betting
conducted on an interstate basis. Specifically,
the IHA was enacted “to regulate interstate
commerce with respect to wagering on
horseracing in order to further the
horseracing and legal off-track betting
industries in the United States” (15 USC §
3001(b)). The states and the horseracing
industry viewed this enactment as
buttressing the legality of their off-track
betting, which existed prior to the IHA’s
enactment (Cabot, 2010; Penchina, 2006).
This was until 1999, when a DOJ
representative announced that the IHA “does
not allow [interstate bets on horseracing],
and if a parimutuel wagering business
currently transmits or receives interstate bets
or wagers (as opposed to intrastate bets or
wagers on the outcome of a race occurring in
another state), it is violating federal gambling
laws” (Hearings on House Bill 3125, 2000;
Jennings, 1999). As a consequence, the
horseracing interests sought clarification of
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the law through an amendment to the IHA
(Cabot & Christiansen, 2005).
The IHA was amended in 2000 to
specifically clarify that pari-mutuel horserace
betting may be conducted on an interstate
basis, which includes placing bets that are
lawful in each state involved and accepted by
an off-track betting system in such states by
telephone or other electronic media (i.e., the
Internet). 9 (The IHA as amended only
addressed interstate pari-mutuel horserace
betting; foreign and other bets will be
discussed later.) (Interstate Horse Racing Act,
§ 3002(3), 1978).
However, in the 2001 Cohen case discussed
earlier, the argument that sports betting fell
within the Wire Act’s safe harbor was
rejected (United States v. Cohen, 2001).
Specifically, Cohen appealed the district
court’s instructions to the jury regarding
what constitutes a bet per se. Cohen
unsuccessfully argued that the WSE
operations fell within the safe harbor because
under WSE’s betting system, which Cohen
likened to horserace account wagering, the
transmissions between WSE and its patrons
contained only information that enabled WSE
itself to place bets from patron accounts
located in Antigua (United States v. Cohen,
Appellant’s Brief, 2000, pp. 2, 8, 16–20).
Although Cohen lost his argument,
horseracing interests have a major point of
distinction between their position and the
Cohen facts—namely, the IHA. The fact that
the IHA was enacted 16 years after the Wire
Act and then later amended for clarification
goes toward finding congressional
recognition of the legality of interstate offtrack betting on horses and specific
congressional intent to except horseracing
and its associated interstate betting from the
Wire Act’s prohibitions.
Another distinction between the IHA and
Cohen is the safe harbor provision, which
requires the transfer of information assisting
in placing bets must be to and from a
jurisdiction in which the betting is legal
(Federal Wire Wager Act of 1961, 2009).
Simply, it was irrelevant how Cohen and WSE
structured the sports betting transactions in

light of the fact that sports betting (not
including horse betting) is illegal in New York
(New York State, 1984; New York State Law,
2010a). In contrast, horserace betting is legal
in New York and many other states (New
York State Law, 2010b, 2010c;
OfficialUSA.com, n.d.).
Nevertheless, the DOJ remains resolute in
its belief that all interstate and foreign
gaming is unlawful under the federal law and
therefore maintains its blanket opposition to
the gaming industry. In 2006, the DOJ
expressed at another congressional hearing
that interstate horserace betting is prohibited
by federal anti-gaming laws—regardless of
the IHA (District of Columbia Appropriations
Act of 2001; Hearings on House Bill 4777,
2006).
This position is unsustainable. One of the
greatest arguments against the DOJ’s position
is the recognized rules of statutory
construction in the United States—those
rules used to interpret laws, which alone
should be a sufficient basis to defeat the DOJ’s
position (Kim, 2008). They state that a
presumption exists that Congress is aware of
existing law when it passes legislation and
amends existing statutes (In re Dobbins, 1968;
South Dakota v. Yankton, 1998; Singer &
Singer, 2001, § 51.02, p. 194). Thus, to the
extent statutes on a subject conflict, the more
recent enactment will usually prevail, which
is the IHA (Marschall v. City of Carson, 1970).
Although it’s clear Congress’s enactment of
the IHA and its amendment was intended to
legalize (and clarify the legality of) off-track
betting on horses, certain inconsistencies
remain that cause confusion. One, the IHA’s
language, as amended, is narrower than
intended and only covers interstate
parimutuel betting on horses, whereas the
Wire Act does not discriminate between the
types of bets that fall within the safe harbor.
Two, the IHA as amended only addresses
interstate pari-mutuel betting, those bets
“transmitted by an individual in one State via
telephone or other electronic media and
accepted by an off-track betting system in the
same or another State,” whereas the Wire Act
safe harbor excepts interstate and foreign
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betting, those bets “from a State or foreign
country where betting on that sporting event
or contest is legal into a State or foreign
country in which betting is legal.”
Even though the IHA’s amended language
is narrower than the Wire Act’s language, the
amended IHA should not be interpreted as
legislative intent that foreign and non-parimutuel bets were not intended to be covered
by the safe harbor (Cabot & Christiansen,
2005). As Cabot and Christiansen (2005, p.
205) note, “The better and more likely
interpretation is that Congress was
concerned that the [US legal stance] was
infringing upon a longtime accepted and
economically important activity [(i.e.,
interstate off-track betting on horses)] and
Congress wanted to stress that the [safe
harbor] applied to this specific set of
circumstances” (Cabot & Christiansen, 2005).
Therefore, it is not that Congress intended to
allow interstate horserace betting while
prohibiting foreign betting but rather
Congress was addressing a specific legal issue
within the United States brought by a specific
lobbying group representing US horseracing
interests. In doing so, Congress had not
drafted the IHA and the amended IHA
language to ensure it matches the Wire Act’s
safe harbor language for foreign betting.
Unfortunately, these inconsistencies and
the confusion surrounding US anti-gaming
laws carried over to the recent dispute at the
WTO. The WTO Dispute Panel, as illustrated
in the section that follows, found the
amended IHA language narrower than the
Wire Act’s language and based on that found
discrimination between domestic and foreign
suppliers of remote betting services.
World Trade Organization, US—Gambling
Antigua and Barbuda (“Antigua”) argued
before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body and
Appellate Body that the US position on
Internet gaming was inconsistent with its
WTO commitments under the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS;
World Trade Organization, 2005). Although
Antigua’s argument cited numerous US
federal and state laws and government

actions and statements as proof of the
inconsistency, the Appellate Body ultimately
rested its decision on the IHA, finding the US
enforcement of the IHA was inconsistent with
its GATS commitments (World Trade
Organization, 2005, n.d., paragraphs 373–
374). In particular, the Appellate Body issued
a final report on April 7, 2005, finding the
United States failed to disprove Antigua’s
claim that the IHA discriminated between
foreign and domestic suppliers of “remote”
horserace betting services (e.g., pari-mutuel
pooling and account wagering) because the
IHA’s language only excepted interstate
betting from the Wire Act’s prohibitions. As a
result, the WTO required the United States to
bring its laws into compliance with the final
report (World Trade Organization, 2005, n.d.,
paragraphs 373–374). 10 However, in fact, as
discussed earlier, the Appellate Body should
have found that no inconsistency or
discrimination against foreign suppliers
exists for remote horserace betting.
The WTO did not reach this conclusion.
This is, in part, a result of both the United
States and Antigua arguing inaccurate
interpretations of US law. The United States,
despite not being defensible, maintained the
consistent position that the Wire Act
prohibited all types of interstate or foreign
gaming, including betting on horseracing
regardless of the IHA. In contrast, Antigua
argued that the IHA, “on its face, authorizes
domestic . . . suppliers, but not foreign . . .
suppliers, to offer remote betting services in
relation to certain horse races” (i.e., because
the IHA only refers to interstate and does not
refer to foreign, whereas the Wire Act’s
prohibitions and safe harbor cover both)
(World Trade Organization, 2005, n.d.,
paragraphs 361–364, 371–372). Per
Antigua’s view, “the IHA ‘exempts’ [US]
suppliers from the prohibitions of the Wire
Act” and other federal anti-gaming laws (see
note 13) while prohibiting foreign suppliers
(World Trade Organization, 2005, n.d.,
paragraphs 361–364, 371–372).
Consequently, the interests of both parties
prevented them from arguing the correct
interpretation of the legal landscape, which is
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that both domestic and foreign suppliers of
remote betting services for horseracing fall
within the Wire Act’s safe harbor. To argue
that position would have meant the United
States acknowledged the Wire Act did not
prohibit all forms of interstate or foreign
gaming. This is an acknowledgment the
United States will not make because doing so
would be contrary to the DOJ’s previously
described continued stance of blanket
opposition to interstate and foreign gaming. If
Antigua argued the correct interpretation,
Antigua would be acknowledging that it
suffered no discrimination, because Antigua’s
remote suppliers would have come under the
purview of the safe harbor. In essence, the
correct analysis of the law was lost because
such argument and interpretation would have
failed to benefit either party’s case before the
WTO.
In actuality, “all [remote] horserace
wagering activity, whether parimutuel or not,
or whether it is interstate or foreign, must fit
within the safe harbor provision of the Wire
Act. The Wire Act makes no distinction
between parimutuel and non-parimutuel
wagers and specifically covers both interstate
and foreign wagering activities. Therefore,
the legal analysis of foreign wagers and
nonparimutuel wagers should be no different
than interstate parimutuel off-track wagers”
(Cabot & Christiansen, 2005). This is readily
apparent when analyzing the Wire Act’s safe
harbor, which is the umbrella under which
legal off-track horserace betting exists. Since
the safe harbor does not qualify the types of
horserace betting that may occur legally, any
type of off-track horserace betting is legal,
regardless of whether the horserace bet is
pari-mutuel or not and regardless of whether
the horserace bet is made on an interstate or
foreign basis.
In summation, the IHA and its amendment
were intended to provide further support of
the legality of horserace betting. The fact that
the IHA as amended discusses interstate parimutuel betting should not serve as a basis for
finding Congress did not intend foreign and
non-pari-mutuel bets to be covered by the
Wire Act safe harbor (Cabot & Christiansen,

2005). Rather, all remote horserace betting
activity, whether it is interstate or foreign, fits
under the safe harbor because the Wire Act
safe harbor equally protects domestic and
foreign suppliers of remote horserace betting
services. Thus, if the laws of both jurisdictions
permit such activity, no basis should exist for
prosecuting a person who transmits
horserace betting information through
interstate or foreign commerce.
While the IHA focuses squarely on the
sport of horseracing, the Professional and
Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992, in
contrast, was intended to encompass and
regulate betting on almost every other
amateur, collegiate, and professional sport.

Professional and Amateur Sports Protect ion
Act
For some time, the professional sports
leagues have distanced themselves from
sports wagering by adopting stringent rules
regarding gambling and gamblers (Cabot,
1998, p. 164). These policies stemmed from
several high-profile scandals in Major League
Baseball. The first and most extensive scandal
broke out in 1920, when eight members of
the Chicago White Sox, including its greatest
star, Shoeless Joe Jackson, were accused of
intentionally losing the World Series. In what
would become known as the “Black Sox
Scandal,” all eight players were acquitted of
criminal charges. Nevertheless, Kenesaw
Mountain Landis, baseball commissioner and
former judge, banned all eight players from
professional baseball for life (Cabot, 1998, pp.
163–164). Consequently, the league adopted
policies that “included bans on wagering by
players, other personnel and owners,
prohibitions on dual ownership of baseball
clubs and legal gambling operations, and
restricting professional teams from
advertising or associating with legal gambling
enterprises” (Cabot, 1998, pp. 163–164).
Yet even with these safeguards in place and
the Wire Act’s ban on interstate and foreign
sports betting, the sports leagues faced a new
challenge in the 1970s from an unlikely
source—state governments. While only
Nevada had an open sports betting industry
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in the 1970s, other states began to look at
tying their lottery products to professional
sports (Hearings on S. 474, 1991). The
innovator in these sports lotteries was the
state of Delaware (Cabot, 1998, p. 164). In
1976, it introduced a “scoreboard” lottery,
which, in essence, was a three-way parlay
card bet on the National Football League
(NFL). 11 Subsequently, the states of Oregon
and Montana legalized similar sports-related
lotteries. Then 13 other states began
considering legalizing some form of sports
betting.
Amateur and professional sports leagues
perceived this as a threat to them for
numerous reasons, including possible
cheating in sports and scandals that would
tarnish their image. In turn, they sought to
curb state-sponsored expansion of sports
betting by lobbying Congress, which
ultimately resulted in the enactment of the
Professional and Amateur Sports Protection
Act of 1992 (PASPA). PASPA makes it
unlawful for “a governmental entity 12 to
sponsor, operate, advertise, promote, license,
or authorize by law or compact, or a person
to sponsor, operate, advertise, or promote . . .
a lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting,
gambling, or wagering scheme based, directly
or indirectly . . . on one or more competitive
games in which amateur or professional
athletes participate, or are intended to
participate, or on one or more performances
of such athletes in such games” (Professional
and Amateur Sports Protection Act, 1992).
PASPA focuses on state-sponsored sports
betting, because legal state-sponsored sports
betting was deemed the most objectionable
and created the perception that the
government approved of betting on sporting
events (Hearings on S. 474, 1991).
Nonetheless, PASPA did contain certain
exceptions. PASPA specifically excepts (1)
animal racing and jai alai and (2) sports
betting operations that already were
permitted under state law but only in the
form in which they existed at any time during
the period of January 1, 1976, to August 31,
1990. This later exception “effectively served
as a grandfather clause for the licensed

sportsbooks in Nevada, the sports lottery
being conducted in Oregon, a sports lottery
authorized under Delaware law, and certain
sports pool betting previously authorized
under Montana law” (Minke & Waddell,
2008).
Of these states, Delaware garnered recent
attention by attempting to reinstitute its
sports lottery after a several-decade hiatus
and concurrently attempting to expand the
forms of sports betting allowed in Delaware
(Millman, 2009). In May 2009, Delaware
Governor Jack Markell attempted to
implement a sports betting scheme that
would include bets “in which the winners are
determined based on the outcome of any
professional or collegiate sporting event,
including racing, held within or without the
State, but excluding collegiate sporting events
that involve a Delaware college or university,
and amateur or professional sporting events
that involve a Delaware team” (OFC
Commissioner Baseball, et al. v. Jack A. Markell
et al., 2009, p. 5).
Soon after, however, the amateur,
collegiate, and professional sports leagues
filed a complaint against Delaware claiming
Delaware’s plan to expand sports betting,
including permitting single-game bets on a
variety of sports, violated PASPA (Fromer,
2009; OFC Commissioner Baseball et al. v. Jack
A. Markell et al., 2009). The court concluded
that Delaware is permitted to conduct sports
betting “to the extent” that such a lottery or
scheme was “actually conducted” by Delaware
during the 1976–1990 time period specified
in PASPA (OFC Commissioner Baseball et al. v.
Jack A. Markell et al., 2009, p. 21).
Accordingly, the court concluded that
Delaware may institute parlay betting on at
least three NFL games, which is the only form
of betting Delaware conducted during that
specific PASPA time period. The court found it
undisputed that no single-game betting was
“conducted” by Delaware during that time
period to qualify for the PASPA exception
(National Football League v. Governor of the
State of Delaware, 1977, p. 1385), so singlegame betting is therefore beyond the scope of
the exception in PASPA and “any effort by
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Delaware to allow wagering on athletic
contests involving sports beyond the NFL
would violate PASPA” (OFC Commissioner
Baseball et al. v. Jack A. Markell et al., 2009, p.
28).
Delaware is not, however, the only
challenge to PASPA. Given the current
economic downturn, many states now are
seeking new ways to raise revenue. By way of
an example, a New Jersey legislator filed a
lawsuit in March 2010 seeking to overturn
PASPA, arguing PASPA is unconstitutional
because it treats four states differently than
the other states (Gambling911.com, 2010).
However, US District Judge Garrett Brown
said New Jersey Senate President Stephen
Sweeney, New Jersey Senator Raymond
Lesniak, and the gaming advocates who filed
the complaint lacked standing to challenge
PASPA’s constitutionality (Interactive Media
Entm’t & Gaming Ass’n v. Holder, 2011, pp. 17–
19). Deciding they had no “standing” to bring
the case, Brown declined to rule on their
other arguments, alleging that PASPA violates
the federal Constitution (Interactive Media
Entm’t & Gaming Ass’n v. Holder, 2011, p. 23).
Brown concluded that under New Jersey law
“the proper party to bring such a claim would
be New Jersey’s attorney general, but the
governor and attorney general have not
intervened in this lawsuit” (Interactive Media
Entm’t & Gaming Ass’n v. Holder, 2011, pp. 30–
31). Nevertheless, in his decision to dismiss,
Brown left the door open for future efforts to
overturn the unconstitutional ban in the
courts. Specifically, if voters in New Jersey
approve a referendum that will be on the
ballot this November to allow the New Jersey
legislature to authorize by law sports betting
at Atlantic City’s casinos and the state’s horse
tracks, New Jersey’s governor and attorney
general may feel compelled to reinstitute the
lawsuit. Additionally, Iowa, Missouri, and
Rhode Island also are looking to legalize
sports betting despite the existing federal
prohibitions and are putting Congress on
notice that they would like the prohibitions
lifted (Jacobs, 2010; Missouri House
Concurrent Resolution of 2010, 2010; Szyba,
2006). But for the time being, PASPA permits

only Nevada, Oregon, Delaware, and Montana
to offer state-sponsored sports betting and
only as that betting was conducted prior to
PASPA’s enactment.

Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act
Another recently enacted law intended to
restrict gaming in the United States is the
Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act
of 2006 (UIGEA), which Congress passed on
September 29, 2006. UIGEA created a new
federal criminal offense imposed primarily
against Internet gaming operators offering
traditional gambling games and accepting
financial payments (i.e., deposits for game
play) in support of their “unlawful Internet
gambling.” UIGEA provides that no person
engaged in the business of betting or
wagering may knowingly accept most
payments, including credit, the proceeds of
credit, credit card payments, electronic fund
transfers (EFTs), or the proceeds from EFTs,
checks, drafts, or similar instruments, or the
proceeds from any other financial transaction
from a player in connection with unlawful
Internet gambling (Unlawful Internet
Gambling Enforcement Act, 2006). In other
words, UIGEA seeks to cut off the flow of
funds from US gamblers to Internet casinos.
UIGEA defines “unlawful Internet
gambling” as “to place, receive, or otherwise
knowingly transmit a bet or wager by any
means which involves the use, at least in part,
of the Internet where such bet or wager is
unlawful under any applicable Federal or state
law in the state in which the bet or wager is
initiated, received, or otherwise made”
(Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement
Act, 2006). This appears identical to the
existing law under the Travel Act and the
Illegal Gambling Business Act 13 where federal
prosecutors need to show a violation of
another law to be a violation of these Acts.
The words of UIGEA, however, are more
favorable to the prosecution, because UIGEA
only requires the prosecution to prove that a
bet on a game is illegal under state law, which
is a much easier threshold to surmount than
proving the Internet gaming operator
violated a state or federal law.
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For example, some states make it unlawful
for persons to play poker for money. These
statutes would not directly assess liability on
a poker site because they are not players. The
bets, however, are unlawful under state law.
Therefore, the site may be charged under
UIGEA for accepting the financial transfer
even if it did not violate the state law directly.
That is, an act not done by the Internet
gaming operator is sufficient to hold the
operator in violation of UIGEA. By way of
another example, Internet gaming operations
accepting bets on a game of basketball or
football would violate UIGEA in the states that
have specifically made such betting illegal,
and even in those states without such laws,
UIGEA would be violated since federal laws
(discussed earlier) prohibit such betting.
UIGEA’s prohibitions do not extend to all
portions of the gaming industry. UIGEA does
not apply to interstate horseracing that
complies with the IHA, fantasy sports or
simulation sports games, games and contests
that do not require consideration other than
personal efforts to play or obtain Internet
access, and educational games or contests. Of
course, these exclusions would not apply to
the acceptance of bets from patrons from
states where betting on these excluded games
is not permitted under a state’s law. Thus,
Internet gaming operators must consult state
gaming laws—much like some of the other
federal laws—to determine the extent to
which their activities may violate UIGEA, fall
within the US legal framework, or require
modifications to fall within the legal
framework.
State Laws
As discussed, federal gaming law does not
outright prohibit all gaming transactions.
Rather, federal gaming law generally only
prohibits certain forms of participation in
gaming transactions where the transactions
are in violation of state law in the state where
they occur, subject to any federal law
constraints on the states. This is consistent
with the underlying federal policy to assist
the states in the enforcement of their
respective state gaming laws. By specifically

requiring a predicate state law violation, all
doubt is removed as to the ability of the states
to set their own gaming policies and look to
federal laws for assistance in doing so. Thus,
in order to address the potential scope and
applicability of the federal law and to
determine if a form of sports gaming is legal,
one must look to the individual state laws.
Each state has the power to adopt its own
versions of laws and, just like federal law,
state laws are constantly being amended and
repealed. Consequently, the laws governing
the various gaming subcategories often are
inconsistent between the states.
Nevertheless, most states do have some
commonality in their general approach to
gaming. Prohibited gaming generally involves
any activity in which the following elements
are present: (1) the award of a prize, (2)
determined on the basis of chance, and (3)
where consideration is required to be paid. If
any of these three elements are missing, then
the activity is generally allowed under state
law (Cabot, Light, & Rutledge, 2009).
Currently, many forms of sports gaming
activities can fall within the US federal and
state legal framework; perhaps one of the
most thriving activities is fantasy sports.
Several reputable operators offer fantasy
sports contests based on the theoretical
premise that fantasy sports are competitions
between the fantasy “team owners” who draft
players to their teams, and these fantasy team
competitions are independent of the actual
skill of the athletes or performance of the
sports teams. The winners of the competition
are based on the accumulated statistics of
individual athlete performances in particular
sports, such as batting average in baseball or
yards gained in football (Isidore, 2006). The
key to the distinction between fantasy sports
and sports betting is that fantasy sports
require the consistent and recognizable
involvement of the contestants to the point of
complete immersion in the contest and to
achieve success such that the activity
transforms from something outside their
control to something within their control
(Cabot & Csoka, 2007). Some of the larger
fantasy sports websites are operated by CBS,
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ESPN, FOX, and Yahoo! (e.g., CBSSports.com,
ESPN, Fox Sports, Sporting News, and Yahoo!
Sports).
Of course, many other sections of the
sports gaming industry are available for
business opportunities. It seems businesses
are continually developing new Internetbased gaming products for consumers (Levy
& Satariano, 2009). Additionally, over 100
horserace tracks operate in the United States,
and some of these also are racino operations
with slot machines (OfficialUSA.com, n.d.).
Disseminators of sports and race information,
live broadcasts and simulcasts, touts, and
handicappers also play a significant role in
the sports gaming industry (e.g., Betting
Kings, Daily Racing Form, NBA Choice). Offtrack betting services also are prominent
portions of the sports gaming industry in the
United States (e.g., Allhorseracing.com,
Capital Off Track Betting, Illinois OTB, TVG).
All of these various gaming opportunities are
grounded in the state laws of the states in
which they exist. This is why it is necessary to
vet a proposed gaming activity by conducting
an analysis of the state laws applicable to
where the activity would occur. While laborintensive and costly, there is no other way to
assess a gaming business’s risk without
surveying each state in which the game or
service will be offered. These surveys are key
to assessing potential state violations that
serve as the basis for the ominous federal
violations discussed earlier by categorizing
the risk associated with offering a proposed
gaming model to persons physically located
in each state. This enables a company to
review the results of the survey, assess the
risk posed by each state’s law, and decide
those states in which it will operate.

Conclusion
The billions of dollars in revenue
generated by the US sports gaming industry is
sufficient evidence of the plentiful sports
gaming business opportunities that exist. As
noted, these opportunities range from
traditional bookmaking activities, such as
those in Nevada, and pari-mutuel race
activities, such as those conducted across the

United States, to involvement in the most
recent sports-derived game innovations, such
as fantasy sports, skill game contests, and
Internet-based games. However, due to the
complex and intricate US legal framework, it
is key to vet the proposed sports gaming
business by conferring with counsel
regarding a thorough review of the proposed
business and analysis of the applicable state
and federal law prior to entering the US
market. This practice assists operators in
assessing legality and making educated
choices as to the level of risk they wish to
hold or the necessity of modifying the
business model.
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Notes

This article was written in June 2011 and published in the Thunderbird International Business Review, © 2011
Wiley Periodicals, Inc
2
The terms bet, wager, and their derivatives are essentially synonyms for the same activity. For consistency, bet is
used in this review unless another term reflects standard industry use or is expressly used by the source reference.
3
All dollar amounts referred to herein are in US dollars.
4
With regard to state laws, most states have some commonality in their general approach to gaming. Prohibited
gaming involves any activity in which a person pays consideration—usually cash—for the opportunity to win a
prize in a game of chance. As a consequence, if any of these three elements are missing, then the activity is
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generally allowed under both state and federal law. Currently, 48 states and the District of Columbia allow some
type of traditional gambling activity, while only Utah and Hawaii restrict all forms.
5
For consistency, the following terminology will be used in this article as it is used in US law. The term intrastate
refers to transactions wholly within a US state or territory, the term interstate refers to a transaction between two or
more US states or US territories, the term foreign refers to transactions between a US state or US territory and
another country, and foreign jurisdiction refers to a jurisdiction other than a US state or territory.
6
The language of the statute “wire communication facility” refers to the technology that existed at the time of
enactment—namely, telephone and telegraph communications (Federal Wire Wager Act of 1961, 2009). However,
this term has been interpreted to encompass almost any known communications medium, including the Internet.
7
In United States v. Barborian (1981, p. 328), the federal district court quoted from the 107 Cong. Rec. 16,534
(1961) and concluded that Congress did not intend to include social bettors within the umbrella of the statute, even
those bettors that bet large sums of money and show a certain degree of sophistication.
8
Gary Kaplan is a founder of the Internet gaming website BetOnSports. com, a website that was the world’s largest
Internet sportsbook. BetOnSports was based in Costa Rica and accepted bets from people located across the globe.
In 2004 alone, BetOnSports had a million registered customers and accepted more than 10 million sports bets in
excess of a billion dollars (“BetOnSports Finds $28 Million,” 2009; United States v. Kaplan, 2008).
9
Despite what was an unequivocal pronouncement that account wagering was legal pursuant to the IHA
amendment, the DOJ still will not concede the legality of off-track betting. In a press statement signing the IHA
amendment into law, President Clinton commented that the DOJ continued its position on “common pool wagering
and interstate account wagering” (Clinton, 2000).
10
The United States did not comply with the WTO Dispute Panel ruling, so Antigua and Barbuda received WTO
authorization to impose remedial trade sections of $21 million annually (World Trade Organization, n.d.).
Ultimately, the United States withdrew its (WTO Dispute Panel–found) commitments to gambling under GATS and
has begun negotiations of compensation adjustments for certain WTO members (Office of the United States Trade
Representative, n.d.).
11
A parlay is a bet placed on the outcome of two or more events in which the bettor must have correctly chosen each
event’s outcome to win. An example of parlay betting is selecting the winning basketball team in three different
games. All three teams selected by the bettor must win for the bettor to win.
12
The term governmental entity is defined to mean any US state, territory, Native American tribe, or any subdivision
of these entities (Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, 1992).
13
Neither the Travel Act nor the Illegal Gambling Business Act is violated unless another law is first violated. Both
also can potentially apply to sports betting, on and off the Internet.
The Travel Act of 1961 (2009) prohibits any person from using “any facility in interstate or foreign commerce”
(e.g., credit cards, bank teller machines, FedEx, telephone, etc.) with the intent to promote, manage, establish, carry
on, or facilitate unlawful activity. Unlawful activity is defined as “any business enterprise involving gambling” in
violation of state or federal laws. Therefore, a person using a facility in interstate or foreign commerce for an
activity deemed to be in violation of state or federal gaming laws could be simultaneously deemed to violate the
Travel Act.
The Illegal Gambling Business Act of 1970 (2009) prohibits any person from financing, owning, or operating an
illegal gambling business. An illegal gambling business is defined as an operation that violates state law, involves
five or more persons, and either is in substantially continuous operation for more than 30 days or has a gross revenue
of more than $2,000 in any single day. Under the Illegal Gambling Business Act, essentially anyone who
participates in an illegal gambling business, other than a mere bettor, may be subject to criminal liability under
federal law.

